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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S 
VALIDATION OF EXPANSIVE DNA 
TESTING OF FEDERAL PAROLEES 
INTRODUCTION 
For many, having blood drawn is simply part of a routine 
doctor's visit. However, for parolees, such as Thomas Kincade, 
their blood is drawn not for medical purposes, but rather to 
extract DNA.! The DNA and the identifying information are 
then loaded into a database, which law enforcement officers 
search every time they attempt to solve a crime with DNA evi-
dence.2 If the parolee refuses, he or she faces misdemeanor 
charges, revocation of release, and more prison time.' 
In United States v. Kincade, a sharply divided Ninth Cir-
cuit, sitting en bane, held that mandatory blood testing of pa-
rolees under certain circumstances is not an unreasonable 
search and seizure and, thus, does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States! While 
courts have considered constitutional challenges to both state 
and federal DNA testing statutes, the majority of these cases 
1 See infra notes 13 to 24 and accompanying text. 
2Id. 
S See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
• United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004). The Kincade 
opinion and this casenote treat the terms parole, probation, and supervised release 
similarly. Id. at 816-17 & n.2 ("Our cases have not distinguished between parolees, 
probationers, and supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes."). 
31 
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concerned inmates, not parolees.· Although the Kincade deci-
sion followed other court decisions in approving DNA testing, 
unlike the other courts that have considered this issue, the 
Kincade court's analysis could be used overbroadly, in violation 
of Fourth Amendment privacy rights.· 
Despite the utility of DNA databases in solving violent 
crimes, such databases should not infringe upon an ordinary 
citizen's constitutionally protected privacy rights. This Note 
asserts that while the outcome of the Ninth Circuit decision in 
U.S. v. Kincade was virtually inevitable, the standard the court 
applied is overbroad and should be applied narrowly as prece-
dent. 
Part I provides a background of federal DNA testing legis-
lation, the Fourth Amendment implications of DNA testing and 
two DNA testing cases leading up to the U.S. v. Kincade deci-
sion.7 Part II analyzes the plurality and dissenting opinions of 
the U.S. v. Kincade decision.s Part III argues that the plural-
ity's balancing test has a potential for inappropriate applica-
tion.9 Finally, Part IV concludes that the Kincade balancing 
test should be narrowly applied as precedent after a meaning-
ful balancing of interests, and not as a fat;ade for ever-
expanding government interests. 10 
1. BACKGROUND 
DNA testing by law enforcement officials for purposes of 
solving or investigating crimes is considered a search and sei-
zure protected by the Fourth Amendment." However, in U.S. 
v. Kincade, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of 
5 See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Murray, 962 
F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992); Groceman v. United States Dept. of Justice, 354 F.3d 
411, 412 (5th Cir. 2004); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004); but see 
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1144 (10th Cir. 2003). 
6 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004); see also infra 
notes 113 to 154 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 11 to 63 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 64 to 112 and accompanying text. 
• See infra notes 113 to 154 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
11 United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989»; see also U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. 
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DNA searches performed pursuant to a federal statute, the 
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.12 
A. THE DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION ACT 
33 
The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (hereinafter, 
"DNA Act") provides the federal government with authority to 
gather DNA samples from people who have been convicted of 
certain federal crimes, such as murder and sex crimes. 13 The 
DNA Act also created authority for federal, state and local law 
enforcement to collect, analyze, and store samples in a DNA 
database called the Combined DNA Index System (hereinafter, 
"CaDIS") from persons convicted of certain federal crimes. 14 
The DNA Act also funds federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment's efforts to process DNA samples collected from crime 
scenes that have the potential to yield important evidence for 
law enforcement.15 
The DNA Act requires federal offenders, convicted of cer-
tain offenses, to submit to mandatory DNA testing.16 The origi-
nal version of the DNA Act required testing of persons con-
victed of the following crimes: murder, manslaughter, homi-
cide, sexual abuse, peonage and slavery, kidnapping, robbery or 
burglary, incest, arson, and attempt or conspiracy to commit 
any of the listed felonies. 17 However, the USA PATRIOT Act, 
passed in October 2001, amended the DNA Act by expanding 
12 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004); DNA Analysis 
Backlog Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000). 
\3 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1), (d)(1) (2001). The list of qualifying crimes was 
changed in October 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(1) (2004). For more discussion 
regarding this change, see infra notes 16 to 19 and 133 to 144 and accompanying text. 
" H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000). CODIS contains DNA profiles from 
every state, including samples taken from persons convicted of qualifying crimes, sam-
ples from crime scenes, and samples provided by families of missing persons. Id. 
CODIS aids law enforcement nationwide by linking crime scenes together to aid inves-
tigations, and matching crime scenes to perpetrators. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819-20. 
For current CODIS statistics, see NDIS Statistics, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/hqnablcodislclickmap.htm. (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Convicted 
offender profiles in CODIS as of December 2004 number 2,038,470 and forensic profiles 
number 93,956. Id. In California, offender profiles number 244,704, forensic profiles 
number 6,673, and 930 investigations were aided as of December 2004. Id. 
1> H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000). 
16 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 816-817 (citing Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Federal Probation 
Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66 Fed. Probation 30, 30-32 (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 
14135a(a)(1) (2001». 
1742 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2000). 
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the list of qualifying offenses to include two additional broad 
categories: "crimes of violence" and "Federal crimes of terror-
ism. ",8 A conviction of any of the listed crimes subjects one to 
testing, whether while in custody of the Bureau of Prisons 
(hereinafter, "BOP"), or after release.19 
Unlike previous statutory attempts requiring DNA testing 
from individuals convicted of crimes, this statute extends its 
reach to individuals after their release from the prison system:o 
For those inmates released before the BOP implemented na-
tionwide testing in 2002, the DNA Act requires that they now 
submit to testing at the request of their parole officer!1 Al-
though only specific crimes require an individual to be tested, 
there is no requirement that the ex-offender be on release from 
prison for his or her original qualifying offense to be subject to 
mandatory testing.22 For example, a person convicted of a 
qualifying offense who is currently on parole or probation for a 
second, non-qualifying crime, is still subject to testing.23 Fur-
thermore, non-compliance with a request for testing carries a 
misdemeanor penalty, which can serve as a basis for revocation 
of release.24 
18 42 u.s.c. § 14135a(d)(2)(a), (b) (2001). A "crime of violence" is defined as "an 
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and 
that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 
16(a), (b) (2004). A "Federal crim[e] of terrorism" is an offense, committed in conjunc-
tion with specified crimes, "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government 
by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 
2332b(g)(5)(a) (2002); see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 846-848; see U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat 272, 364 (2001). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2) (2004). The BOP takes blood samples from quali-
fying incarcerated individuals pursuant to the DNA Act. Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Fed· 
eral Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66 Fed. Probation 30, 30 (2002). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2) (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8-9 (2000). 
21 Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Federal Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection, 
66 Fed. Probation at 30 (2002). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (2001). 
23 [d.; see also, e.g., United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1133 (E.D. Cal 
2002) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5) (2004) ("An individual from whom the collection of a 
DNA sample is authorized under this subsection who fails to cooperate in the collection 
of that sample shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and punished in accordance 
with Title 18."); see also United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 
7B1.3(a)(1) (2004); available at http://www.ussc.govI2004guidlgI2004.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2005). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss1/4
2005] EXPANSIVE DNA TESTING 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE DNA ACT 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held "that taking a blood 
sample constitutes a search [of a person] under the Fourth 
Amendment. ""5 The Fourth Amendment delineates every per-
son's right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" 
of their body, property, and homes.26 For a search to be consid-
ered reasonable, it must be supported by probable cause that 
there is "evidence of a crime or illegal goods at the place to be 
searched."27 Ordinarily, a warrant is evidence of, and sup-
ported by probable cause.28 However, in certain situations 
where procuring warrants are impractical, an exception to the 
warrant requirement may justify a search.29 
1. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
One line of exceptions to traditional Fourth Amendment 
analysis consists of searches conducted pursuant to special 
needs.3D Special needs searches accomplish "important non-law 
enforcement purposes" in situations where warrants are im-
,. See Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989». 
,. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also, e.g., Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757, 
767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal 
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."). 
'rI U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, 
Criminal Procedure § 3.3(a), 141 (4th ed. 2004); Myron Moskovitz, Cases and Problems 
in Criminal Procedure: The Police 3 (4th ed. 2004). 
28 LaFave, Israel, King, supra. To obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers 
submit affidavits to a magistrate judge stating facts or evidence supporting the conclu-
sion that a search is likely to lead to evidence helpful to an investigation. Kincade,379 
F.3d at 822. 
29 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822; see also Jonathan Kravis, Case Comment: A Better 
Interpretation of "Special Needs" Doctrine after Edmond and Ferguson, 112 Yale L.J. 
2591, 2598 (June 2003) ("[WJhether or not the maintenance of a DNA database for the 
purpose of exonerating innocent persons is properly characterized as law-enforcement-
related, that benefit simply cannot be achieved without a regime of warrantless 
searches. If the government had to obtain a warrant before conducting DNA Act 
searches, the CODIS database would likely fail. The government would not be able to 
establish probable cause for the vast majority of the searches, and would not go to the 
trouble of getting so many warrants even if it could. The warrantless searches man-
dated by the DNA Act are not merely law enforcement shortcuts. Rather, they are a 
necessary precondition to the maintenance of a DNA database .... "). 
30 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24. Two other exceptions are exempted areas and 
administrative searches. [d. Exempted area searches include searches at borders and 
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practicaL3! Non-law enforcement entities, such as employers, 
school authorities, or probation officers, usually conduct special 
needs searches pursuant to public health and safety objec-
tives.32 For example, sobriety tests are considered an accept-
able special need that is exempted from warrant and probable 
cause requirements.33 
Courts have also made an exception to Fourth Amendment 
search requirements by applying a balancing test, which com-
pares the searchee's expectation of privacy against the public 
policy behind the particular search." The United States Su-
preme Court's holdings in Schmerber v. California and Winston 
v. Lee concerned bodily intrusions, which the Court analyzed 
with a balancing test."5 
2. Schmerber v. California 
In Schmerber v. California, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a blood extraction implicated, but did not vio-
late, the Fourth Amendment."6 In Schmerber, a police officer 
ordered a doctor to draw blood from a suspect involved in a 
drunken driving accident. 37 The Court balanced the intrusion 
of the blood draw against the need to collect evidence of the 
blood alcohol level of the suspect."B The Court held that because 
the driver's blood alcohol level would decrease before the officer 
could secure a warrant, the police officer did not act unrea-
sonably in requiring a blood draw before procuring a warrant.39 
The Court cautioned, however, that the holding in Schmerber 
31 Id. at 823. 
32 Id.; William E. Ringel, Searches, Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 10.13 
(2004), WL. 
33 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 
§ 5.4(c), 208 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Fink v. Ryan, 174 m. 2d 302, 308 WI. 1996». 
The Fink court held that because "Illinois has a special need to suspend the licenses of 
chemically impaired drivers and to deter others from driving while chemically im-
paired," sobriety tests are acceptable to fulfill that special need. Id. 
34 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (stating that the 
"need to search" is balanced "against the invasion which the search entails.") . 
.. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753, 766 (1985). 
36 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767,772. 
37 Id. at 758. 
38 Id. 770-71. 
39 Id. 
6
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did not to permit "more substantial intrusions, or intrusions 
under other conditions."'o 
3. Winston v. Lee 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in a later case, 
Winston v. Lee, balanced a surgical intrusion against the need 
for preserving evidence of a crime:! In Winston, a suspect in an 
attempted robbery was shot by his intended victim:2 The Com-
monwealth of Virginia attempted to force the suspect to un-
dergo surgery to recover the bullet from his body, which the 
Commonwealth wanted to use it as evidence against the sus-
pect.'3 The Court granted the suspect injunctive relief to pre-
vent the Commonwealth from forcing him to undergo anesthe-
sia and surgery:' 
In granting the injunction, the Court noted that "[a] com-
pelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence . 
. . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such mag-
nitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to 
produce evidence of a crime."'5 The search was unreasonable 
because the Commonwealth's interest in the bullet did not 
outweigh the privacy intrusion brought on by surgically remov-
ing the bullet lodged in the suspect's chest:· 
Despite the fact that the searches in both Schmerber and 
Winston were conducted pursuant to the government's asser-
tion of a need to collect evidence and solve crimes, the Winston 
court found that the surgical intrusion was much greater than 
the intrusion of Schmerber's blood extraction, and could not 
pass Fourth Amendment muster:7 Schmerber and Winston 
thus laid the groundwork for challenges to DNA testing legisla-
tion in Rise v. Oregon and United States v. Miles:s 
40 [d. at 772. 
41 Winston, 470 U.S. at 766. 
42 [d. at 755-56. 
43 [d. at 757, 767 . 
.. [d. at 757-58, 767 . 
.., [d. at 759. 
'" [d. at 766 . 
• 7 [d. 
48 Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F. 3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 
1160 (1996); United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
37 
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C. CHALLENGES TO DNA TESTING LEGISLATION: PRIVACY VS. 
GOVERNMENT INTERESTS 
1. Rise v. State of Oregon' privacy expectation of inmates 
In Rise v. State of Oregon, the prison inmate plaintiffs 
challenged an Oregon law that is similar to the DNA Act in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.49 The law re-
quires DNA testing of persons convicted of sex offenses or mur-
der.50 The district court upheld the Oregon DNA testing law 
under a special needs analysis.51 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision, but instead of using a special needs 
test, employed a balancing test, weighing law enforcement 
needs against the minimal intrusion of a blood extraction, 
which the court said was "substantially the same as ... finger-
printing. "52 
The dissent in Rise disagreed with the majority's use of the 
balancing test.53 Citing Schmerber v. California, the dissent 
found that a blood extraction, unlike fingerprinting in the book-
ing process, was not sufficiently "routine" to justify the privacy 
intrusion. 54 According to the dissent, the DNA extraction in 
Rise could not be constitutional because Schmerber's holding 
required individualized suspicion. 55 
2. United States v. Miles: Privacy expectation of parolees 
In a subsequent case, United States v. Miles, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California limited the 
Rise balancing test in a successful Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to the DNA Act:6 In Miles, the defendant committed 
armed robbery, a qualifying feiony, in 1974:7 When the DNA 
49 Rise, 59 F. 3d at 1558. 
00 Id. 
51 Id. at 1559. 
52 [d. (citing Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (stating that "it is 
elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to . . . finger-
printing ... as part of routine identification processes."». 
63 Rise, 59 F. 3d at 1564 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. 
65 Id. at 1565 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
56 United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2002). The government 
did not appeal this decision to the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
57 Id. at 1132. 
8
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Act was passed in 2000, the defendant was on supervised re-
lease for a different non-qualifying felony, possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon. 68 He argued that requiring him to 
submit to testing violated the Fourth Amendment because the 
government had no evidence of probable cause except for his 
original conviction, thirty years prior!9 
39 
The district court agreed with the defendant, and did so by 
distinguishing Rise. GO Someone on parole for a different crime 
thirty years after his qualifying conviction, the district court 
reasoned, does not have a sufficiently lowered expectation of 
privacy to tip the balance in favor of the government's interest 
in DNA testing.61 Therefore, the privacy interests of a convicted 
person on release were greater thirty years after the offense 
than closer in time to the original offense.62 Even though Rise 
only requires a conviction to lessen a person's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, Miles requires that the conviction be con-
temporaneous with the government's DNA-testing need for the 
balance of interests to tip in favor of the government.63 
II. UNITED STATES V. KINCADE DECISION 
A year after the Miles court found parolees could not be 
constitutionally subjected to DNA testing, a Northern District 
of California court was faced with a parolee's DNA testing chal-
lenge in United States. u. Kincade. 64 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Thomas Kincade committed bank robbery with a firearm 
in July 1993:5 Kincade pled guilty and was sentenced to 97 
months in prison and three years of supervised release.G6 After 
serving his sentence, he was released from prison in August of 
.. [d. 
69 [d. at 1134. 
60 [d. at 1138, 1141. 
6. [d. at 1138. 
62 [d. 
63 Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F. 3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1160 (1996); Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. 
64 Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1141; United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 820-21 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
GO Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820. 
M [d. 
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2000.67 The conditions of his release contained a requirement 
that he abide by the directives of his probation officer and "re-
frain from committing another Federal, state or local crime."68 
Kincade's bank robbery conviction is a qualifying offense 
for blood testing under the DNA Act. 69 However, he was re-
leased from custody before passage of the DNA Act, and before 
the BOP implemented testing.70 In March of 2002, Kincade's 
parole officer requested a blood sample for testing.7l Kincade 
refused to submit to testing.72 Kincade's refusal provided a ba-
sis for revocation of his parole. 73 
At his revocation hearing, Kincade challenged the validity 
of the DNA Act on several grounds, including violation of the 
Fourth Amendment." The district court disagreed and revoked 
his parole, but stayed the sentence while the Ninth Circuit ex-
pedited his appeal.75 Pending appeal, Kincade committed an 
additional violation of the conditions of his supervised release 
by testing positive for drug use.76 Following this violation, the 
district court judge lifted the stay on Mr. Kincade's sentence.77 
Once Kincade was imprisoned, and in custody of the BOP, he 
was forced to submit to DNA testing. 78 However, he continued 
his constitutional challenge to the DNA Act.7• 
On appeal, Kincade asserted "a privacy expectation in his 
body, bodily fluids and DNA."80 He also argued that no prob-
able cause existed to justify the intrusion because he was not 
67 Id. 
68 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003). 
69 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2004). 
70 Id. Kincade was released in August, but the DNA Act was not passed until 
later that same year, in December of 2000. Id.; see also DNA Analysis Backlog Elimi-
nation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000). 
71 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820. 
72Id. 
73 Id. at 82l. 
7. Id. Kincade also challenged the DNA Act on grounds that it violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, separation of powers, and the Due Process Clause. Id. 
75 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1098-99 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813,821 (9th Cir. 2004). If the court had not stayed 
the sentence, Kincade would have immediately been subjected to testing once in cus-
tody of the BOP. Id. 




80 Opening Br. for Appellant at 22, United States v. Kincade, 2002 WL 32181458 
(9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-50380). 
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under suspicion for a crime when his parole officer requested a 
blood sample.B1 He argued that the special-needs exception 
could not apply because the DNA Act has a clear law enforce-
ment purpose of solving crimes.B2 This purpose is, therefore, in 
direct conflict with the requirement that special needs be for a 
non-law enforcement purpose.B3 Kincade did not argue against 
a balancing-test exception on appeal.B' 
A three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
DNA Act violated Kincade's Fourth Amendment rights.B5 After 
noting the general rule that reasonable searches are supported 
by probable cause, the Ninth Circuit panel employed a three-
part analysis.B6 First, the court analyzed the Fourth Amend-
ment implications of DNA testing, and rejected the Rise hold-
ing that found no difference between fingerprinting and blood 
extractions.B7 Second, the court decided that DNA testing of 
parolees could not satisfy a constitutional balancing test with-
out reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed an 
additional crime.BB Third, the court rejected the idea that a spe-
. cial-needs exception could apply to DNA testing, because the 
purpose of the DNA Act was to acquire "evidence for future 
criminal investigations," a clear law enforcement purpose.B' 
The majority of the panel viewed the forced extraction of 
Kincade's blood and subsequent categorization of his DNA as 
an unwarranted privacy invasion.'o For that reason, the court 
held the DNA Act unconstitutional. ,1 However, the dissent 
cited the Rise balancing test as binding precedent and argued 
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Knights 
81 [d. 
82 [d. at 21-22. 
83 [d. at 22. 
M See generally, Opening Br. for Appellant, United States v. Kincade, 2002 WL 
32181458 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-50380). 
85 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir 2003). 
86 [d. at 1096, 110l. 
87 [d. at 1100-01. 
88 [d. at 1102 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)). The 
United States Supreme Court's holding in Knights required reasonable suspicion to 
search a probationer's home. [d. See also infra notes 115 to 119 and accompanying 
text. 
89 Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1101, 1112. 
90 [d. at 1113-14 ("Privacy erodes fIrst at the margins, but once eliminated, its 
protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage cannot be undone") (quoting 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Cancer Ward 192 (Nicholas Bethell & David Burg trans., 
Modern Library 1995) (1968))). 
91 Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1113. 
11
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supported the application of a balancing test because parolees 
have a lessened expectation of privacy.92 In response to a peti-
tion for rehearing filed by the Department of Justice shortly 
after the court issued the decision, the Ninth Circuit issued an 
order stating that the Ninth Circuit judges would rehear Mr. 
Kincade's appeal en banc.93 
B. EN BANC NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, who authored the dissent in 
the original Kincade opinion, wrote the Ninth Circuit's en banc 
decision.94 Judge Ronald Gould concurred in the decision, offer-
ing a different analysis.95 Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who had 
written the original opinion, led the dissent. 96 
1. The Plurality 
Five judges, forming a plurality, held that DNA testing of 
parolees under the DNA Act was constitutional under a balanc-
ing test similar to the test espoused in Rise. 97 The plurality be-
gan by acknowledging the "advance of technology" and its im-
plications for Fourth Amendment privacy rights.98 Then, dis-
agreeing with the original panel decision, the plurality cited 
Rise v. Oregon as binding precedent for application of a balanc-
ing test to approve blood testing of persons with a lowered ex-
pectation of privacy, even though Rise concerned inmates, not 
parolees.99 Kincade's status as a parolee was enough of a pri-
vacy-expectation reduction to justify the intrusion. 100 
92 [d. at 1114, 1116 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
93 United States v. Kincade, 354 F.3d 1000, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); cf Pet. of the 
United States for Reh'g and for Reh'g En Bane, United States v. Kincade (No. 02-
50380) (2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/kincade/us_pet.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2005) . 
.. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004). 
95 [d. at 840. 
00 [d. at 842. 
97 [d. at 839 & n.39. 
98 [d. at 821 (citing Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27,33-34 (2001). 
99 Kincade, 379 F.3d 837 (citing Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996) (holding that "[olnce a person is convicted of 
one of the felonies included as predicate offenses under [Oregon's DNA testing statute], 
his identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the identifying information derived from the blood sampling."). 
100 Kincade, 379 F.3d 839. 
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The panel also found that compelling policy interests out-
weighed Kincade's reasonable expectations of privacy.IOI The 
overwhelming purpose of parole is to protect the public from 
victimization by preventing recidivism, through rehabilita-
tion. l02 The increased ability to identify criminals with the help 
of a DNA database creates a deterrent effect because criminals 
are aware they could be easily identified by leaving DNA evi-
dence at a crime scene.103 Thus, the plurality reasoned that 
DNA extraction, on balance, was constitutional because of Kin-
cade's lowered expectation of privacy, and the public interest in 
creating a comprehensive DNA database. 10. Judge Gould con-
curred in the opinion, but would have justified the reach of the 
DNA statute to Kincade with the special-needs exception. 105 
2. The Dissent 
The dissent, following the original Ninth Circuit Kincade 
decision, argued that DNA testing must follow the traditional 
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure requirements. lOG Be-
cause of the strict Fourth Amendment standards of individual-
ized suspicion and reasonableness, the dissent rejected the ap-
plication of a balancing test. 107 The balancing test was unem-
ployable, the dissent reasoned, because it was too easy to tip 
the balance of interests in favor of the government. lOS 
The dissent reasoned that under the plurality's balancing 
test, essentially anyone with a reduced expectation of privacy is 
potentially subject to a blood extraction for CODIS.lo, Given the 
expansion of the qualifying crimes covered by the DNA Act, it 
seems likely that the scope of people subject to blood testing 
101 [d. at 838. 
102 [d. at 839. 
103 [d. at 839 & n.38 (citing Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561) (noting that DNA identification 
can "absolve the innocent just as easily as it can inculpate the guilty."). 
10< Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839. 
105 [d. at 840-42 (Gould, J., concurring). Judge Gould disagreed with the applica-
tion of the balancing test, finding the special needs exception to be a more proper 
analysis. [d. at 842. Noting the plurality's reluctance to apply a special needs test, 
Judge Gould reasoned that the deterrent effect of a DNA database "serves the special 
needs" of a probation system. [d. 
106 [d. at 844 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
107 [d. at 861 & n.21 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
lOB [d. at 849-50, 861 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
109 [d. at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
43 
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could similarly grow."O Just as convicted criminals have a 
lower expectation of privacy, so do people attending public edu-
cational institutions, people traveling on airplanes and people 
applying for driver's licenses or federal employment.l11 A low-
ered expectation of privacy, when evaluated as one side of a 
simple balancing test, could lead to DNA testing of an ever-
expanding group of citizens, not limited to parolees who have 
committed particularly heinous crimes. ll2 The Kincade holding 
likely sets a standard for future Ninth Circuit court decisions. 
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE KINCADE BALANCING TEST 
The Kincade plurality was confident that when future 
DNA testing affects the rights of law-abiding citizens, as op-
posed to "lawfully adjudicated criminals," the courts would "re-
spond appropriately.""3 But the expansion of caselaw allowing 
invasive searches of parolees and the growth of government 
interests in DNA testing citizens not yet convicted of crimes 
suggests that ordinary citizens' privacy rights are already in 
danger.u4 Kincade could easily be used as a rubber-stamp for 
government interests. Because of this potential, future court 
decisions should narrowly apply the Kincade balancing test, 
and not use it as a fa~de or pretense for building overbroad 
DNA databases. The test should be limited to persons con-
victed of, and on parole for, violent crimes, as it was in Kin-
cade, so that government interests do not automatically out-
weigh the privacy interests of the individual. 
A. CASELAW ALLOWING PAROLEE SEARCHES: LoWERING 
STANDARDS 
The stretching of the logic of the balancing test through 
the caselaw of United States v. Knights, Rise v. Oregon, and 
United States v. Kincade, indicates the potential for an over-
broad application of the Kincade balancing test. 
110 Id. at 849 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
111 Id. at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[Alny person who experiences a reduc-
tion in his expectation of privacy ... would be susceptible to having his blood sample 
extracted and included in CODIS ... ."). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 838. 
114 See, e.g., infra notes 115 to 154 and accompanying text. 
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1. United States v. Knights: "Reasonable Suspicion" Required 
for Probationers 
45 
In Knights, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
"reasonable suspicion" standard of criminal activity, rather 
than the higher standard of probable cause, could justify the 
search of a probationer's home because the probation system's 
interests outweighed the probationer's privacy interests. 115 The 
probation system's interests in Knights were "rehabilitation" 
and preventing recidivism. 11s The Court found that the proba-
tioner's status as a probationer lessened his privacy interests.l17 
Because of this, the balance tipped in favor of the govern-
ment. 11S However, Knights did not decide whether a proba-
tioner could be searched without "reasonable suspicion."119 
2. Rise v. Oregon: DNA Search of Inmates Approved, No Sus-
picion Necessary 
In Rise, the Ninth Circuit extended the Knights logic to al-
low blood testing of inmates, and eliminated the requirement of 
"reasonable suspicion.'''20 The court used a balancing test to 
approve DNA blood testing for inmates convicted of murder or 
sexual offenses. i2i The government interests in Rise were "pre-
venting recidivism" and maintaining a DNA database to "iden-
tifly] and prosecut[e]" criminals. i22 Two factors limited the in-
mates' privacy interests. i23 First, the inmates had a reduced 
expectation of privacy because of their status as convicted fel-
ons, as opposed to free persons. i24 Second, the court found the 
intrusion too minimal to offend their lessened privacy inter-
ests.i25 Thus, the court disregarded the Knights rule and al-
115 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001). 
116 [d. at 119. 
m [d. at 119-20. 
118 [d. at 12l. 
i19 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). 
120 Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1160 (1996). 
12i Rise, 59 F.3d at 156l. 
122 [d. at 1562. 
123 [d. at 1559-62. 
124 [d. at 1560. 
125 [d. at 1559. 
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lowed DNA searches of convicted incarcerated felons without 
any level of suspicion of new criminal activity.126 
3. Kincade en banc logic: DNA Search of Parolee's Approved 
In Kincade en banc, the court held that a parolee's reduced 
expectation of privacy could subject him to DNA blood testing.127 
As in Rise, the government's interests were defined as prevent-
ing recidivism and solving future crimes. 128 The parolee's inter-
ests were determined according to the Rise standard of mini-
mal intrusion and lowered expectation of privacy.l29 Following 
this analysis, the Kincade court found that blood testing did 
not constitute a major privacy violation because of the minimal 
intrusion. 130 Moreover, parolees' expectations of privacy are 
limited because they are under supervision and subject to strict 
restrictions while they finish their sentences outside of con-
finement. l3l Therefore, in Kincade, the balance of interests 
tipped again in favor of the government.132 
The progression of caselaw from Knights through Kincade 
en banc indicates that where there is diminished expectation of 
privacy and a balancing test is applied, the government inter-
est will outweigh privacy interests. Given this demonstrated 
expansion of allowable searches from a lowered threshold of 
suspicion in Knights to simply a reduced expectation of privacy 
of parolees in Kincade, there is potential for further expansion 
of allowable DNA searches. 
B. GoVERNMENT INTERESTS EXPANDING: NOT JUST VIOLENT 
CRIMINALS 
DNA-testing legislation has expanded to include more 
crimes since its inception. This growth of legislation illustrates 
the expansion of the government's goals in connection with 
DNA databases beyond the original goals. The Kincade balanc-
126 Id. at 1562. 
127 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 836. 
131 Id. at 834. 
132 Id. at 839. 
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ing test should be used with this expansion in mind to prevent 
the erosion of privacy interests. 
The original purpose of federal DNA testing was to create 
a database of offenders who were the "worst of the worst.",33 
Murders and rapists were the top priority for DNA testing.ls4 
CODIS was created to house identifying information for sex 
offenders, and persons convicted of "Federal crimes of violence, 
robbery and burglary.",36 The original version of the DNA Act 
limited the original qualifying crimes accordingly, and included 
murder, sexual abuse, slavery, kidnapping, robbery, and bur-
glary.l36 However, the government's priorities have since 
grown. 
As the Kincade en bane dissent discussed, the USA 
PATRIOT Act expanded the list of qualifying crimes. IS7 This 
expansion means that certain nonviolent offenders are now 
subject to DNA testing. While several serious crimes, such as 
aircraft hijacking were added to the list of qualifying crimes, 
less serious offenses are now subject to DNA testing. 13B Some of 
these qualifying crimes include crimes such as harboring illegal 
aliens,139 egg-product-inspection interference,14o possession of an 
unregistered firearm,141 voter-registration coercion,142 and im-
peding "enforcement officer" inspections of fishing vessels. 143 
The government's revision of the list of qualifying crimes to 
include nonviolent offenses confirms the potential for more re-
133 H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 10 (2000). 
134 [d. 
135 [d. at 9. 
136 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2000). 
131 U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat 272, 364 (2001). 
L38 [d. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(2) (2001) for the DNA Act as amended by the 
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. The amendment lists any offense committed under 18 U.S.C. § 
2332b(g)(5)(a) (2002), or "Federal crime[s) of terrorism" as offenses that qualify for 
testing. [d. Aircraft hijacking is one such crime. [d; see also 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2005). 
139 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2005), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 28 
C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005». 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 is the Federal Regulation that lists offenses 
subject to DNA testing. [d. The 2004 version of this regulation listed several crimes 
subject to DNA testing. [d. The current version, as amended in January 2005 now 
states that any felony qualifies for testing. [d. 
140 21 U.S.C. § 1041(b) (2005), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 
28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005». 
141 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2005), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 
28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005». 
1<2 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 28 
C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005». 
143 16 U.S.C. § 773e(a)(3), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 28 
C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005». 
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visions. The DNA database is no longer limited to violent of-
fenders. 
Expanding government interests are also evidenced by an 
October 2004 amendment to the DNA Act that requires DNA 
testing for all persons convicted of felonies. The "Justice for All 
Act of 2004" amended the DNA Act's list of qualifying felonies 
to "any felony.''''' This amendment provides funding and au-
thority for law enforcement agencies to collect DNA from any 
person convicted of a felony. 
Further, not all felonies are violent. Generally, a felony is 
any crime punishable by over a year in prison. 145 For example, 
malum prohibitum property crimes such as embezzlement, 
false pretenses, or passing bad checks could carry penalties of 
more than one year in prison, depending on the nature of the 
crime. 146 History thus suggests that the list of qualifying crimes 
could continue to grow along with the government's growing 
interests in DNA databases. 
C. LOWERED PRIVACY INTERESTS AND PRESUMPTION OF GUILT 
The DNA Act currently applies to lawfully adjudicated 
convictions only.147 However, recent legislation on the federal 
and state level allows persons not yet convicted to be tested 
and included in DNA databases.us 
144 Justice For All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004); see 
also 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005). 
148 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 1.6(a), 30 (3d ed. 2000). 
146 Theft, for example, carries a base level of 7, which the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines suggest 0-6 years imprisonment. See United States Sentencing Com-
mission, Guidelines Manual §§ 2B1. l(a)(1), 5A tbl. (2004), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2004guidlgI2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Malum prohibi-
tum is defined as "[aln act that is crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, 
although the act itself is not necessarily immoral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (2d 
Pocket ed. 2001). 
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(a)(1) (2004) (stating that the DNA Act applies to 
persons who "[arel, or ha[vel been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense") (emphasis 
added». 
148 See, e.g., California's Proposition 69, where the voters approved DNA testing 
for some arrestees. 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 69 § 3 (West) (amending Cal. Penal 
Code § 296 (West 2004»; see also Easy Voter Guide re: Proposition 69, available at 
http://www.easyvoter.org/californiainextelectionl2004-generall3-69.html (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2005). 
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1. Equal Justice for Some? 
The Equal Justice for All Act, which amended DNA Act's 
qualifying crime list to include all felonies, changed the types of 
allowable state DNA profiles in CODIS.I<' States may now in-
clude DNA samples of persons indicted in state court proceed-
ings in the federal DNA database.'50 While indictees' cases are, 
by definition, not yet lawfully adjudicated, there could be a 
temptation to treat indictees as having a lowered expectation of 
privacy. 151 This could thus subject persons not convicted of 
crimes to the losing side of the balancing test. 
2. California Plans to DNA Test Arrestees and Juveniles 
California's Proposition 69, which was approved by voters 
in November of 2004, requires DNA testing of all felony arrest-
ees as well as juvenile offenders in California. 152 While those 
persons not convicted or found not guilty of any crime may re-
quest expungement of their DNA record, the process requires 
applying to the trial court for a discretionary expungement -
most likely people will not bother with it.'53 
The Kincade dissent feared that the balancing test was too 
weak a standard. 154 Only time will tell if, like the push for test-
ing at indictment and arrest, persons not associated with 
criminal behavior will be singled out for testing. Given the ex-
pansion of government interests over time, the testing of free 
citizens may not be too far-fetched. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES? 
With this push for DNA database expansion, every citi-
zen's privacy rights are in danger. Under a broad application 
of the Kincade balancing test, it appears that where a dimin-
I'. Justice For All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004). 
150 [d. 
151 An indictee is "[a] person who has been ... officially charged with a crime." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). 
152 See 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 69 § 3 (West) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 296 
(West 2004»; cf Easy Voter Guide, supra note 148. 
153 See 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 69 § 9 (West) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 299 
(West 2004»; cf Easy Voter Guide, supra note 148. 
154 United States V. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 844 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
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ished expectation of privacy exists, it will be outweighed by the 
government's interest in taking and storing one's DNA. As the 
dissent fears, this diminished expectation of privacy could af-
fect more than just parolees. A balancing test is too simple, 
amorphous, and subjective a standard to allow it to be applied 
without care. The plurality assured us in Kincade that courts 
would recognize when the "parade of horribles" began.155 But 
while our rights slowly erode, we may not even notice. For 
some, like people on parole for relatively de minimus offenses 
who have a more serious felony in their distant past, it has al-
ready begun. 
CLAIRE S. HULSE' 
155 [d. at 838. 
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